Our Methodology Note
The first step in the collection and analysis of information for our research project ‘The Misinformation Web,’ was a review of notes, studies, and published articles about the spread of fake news in Spanish in the United States. We identified works like these from the Reuters Institute and reports from the Associated Press, among others, which reveals a concerning context regarding this phenomenon and its evolution in recent years.
Next, we reached out to the Factchequeado team, an organization specialized in detecting and verifying disinforming narratives and fake news in Spanish in the US. In addition to deepening our understanding of the context surrounding this issue, they provided us access to the database of articles they have published this year, along with the metadata and sources behind them.
Using the information from Factchequeado , we filtered and focused only on the fact-checks related to political content, and we built our own database. As a result, we obtained a list of 87 false news stories or disinformation narratives analyzed by Factchequeado between January and August 2024. We observed that the amount of detected false political content increased as the year progressed, and we identified the most recurrent topics and scopes.
One of the stories fact checked by Factchequeado about the use of lethal force in the FBI operation at Donald Trump’s residence in Florida in 2022 included an example of a video published on the YouTube channel VENEZUELA NEWS, which had gained significant traction. The profile of Juan Torres, the creator and host of that channel, would become an important starting point for our research.
From there, we built a dossier on Torres in which, among other things, we identified inconsistencies about his physical location, the frequency of his video uploads, his recurring sources, the evolution of his content type, the countries and states where his listeners are located, and more. Simultaneously, we conducted ongoing monitoring of the publications on VENEZUELA NEWS during the months the research lasted.
As a result of this investigation, we were able to identify an address in the United States, specifically in Doral, Florida, where we later went to inquire about Torres.
The disinformation story about the FBI operation at Trump’s house, fact-checked by Factchequeado, also allowed us to trace the path that this ‘information’ took. We identified the original source of this content in English, the profiles and the timelines that led to it becoming a Spanish video by Torres. From there, we were able to outline a pattern that we called the disinformation web.
Next, we built a ‘timeline’ in which we identified at least five other examples where the evolution of disinformation content was similar: it originated in English and then transformed into Spanish content.
This timeline and a new interview with one of the researchers from Factchequeado led us to another generator of disinformation content in Spanish: John Acquaviva—in England. Just like in the case of Torres, we worked into researching his profile using open sources and monitored the content published on his main YouTube channel.
With the guidance of an expert in using specialized tools for searching information about people in open sources, we obtained additional data about the profiles of Torres and Acquaviva. With this metadata, we proceeded to reach out to both for their respective interviews and the rest of the field research.
At the same time, we continued monitoring the channels of both individuals and reviewing content from Factchequeado to study the evolution and frequency of the published materials, paying special attention to how the topics presented by Torres and Acquaviva aligned with the news cycle of the moment.